Electing the Capital Region District Board is not enough!
November 10, 2016
Nearly everyone recognizes that the current governance structure of the CRD Board and the selection of its member appointments by municipal councils is neither accountable nor democratic.
Recently suggestions have been made that the remedy is simply to elect a separate Chair and Board members. The Chair would then be the de facto super mayor of Greater Victoria, and able to represent the region on federal and provincial matters.
While that may be a prudent change, it does not resolve fundamental structural flaws and the operation of regional districts in BC:
Serious negative consequences arise from these structural limitations. Instead of agreeing to share regional-scale service delivery, most municipal councils choose to try provide their own local services, e.g. planning, police fire, roads, water delivery, garbage collection etc. In doing so they ignore the obvious daily interaction of regional residents who travel across the region to work, play, learn, and shop in municipalities other than where they live. Further natural and emergency occurrences such as floods, fires, chemical spills, earthquakes, environment issues (I.e. air, water, wildlife) do not respect municipal boundaries, but the impacts are either shared by all residents or by municipalities that are least prepared and equipped to deal with them. Neither are urban crime or social issues confined to local neighbourhoods.
What would be the effect of having an elected CRD Board if the few mandated regional services it provides continue to be limited to only water supply, landfill, sewerage, and regional parks? It means that critical issues, such a regional land use plan, transportation, emergency services and transit, which can only be resolved at a regional scale, would still be provided by small local units whose prime motive is to protect their self interest. We get 7 emergency dispatch centres, 17 fire departments, 5 police chiefs, 7 recreation commissions etc. and no regional transportation authority. And rural residents continue to get a free ride as they use urban services funded only by urban taxpayers. This is violation of the principle that those who benefit from a service should pay for it.
Resolution can be achieved by either of two separate approaches. The Province could expand the mandate of region districts, or by amalgamation of some or all municipalities that recognize common interest or to achieve economies of expanded scale of service delivery.
A typical CRD Board meeting agenda reveals that the majority of items relate only to a single municipality or to rural residents. A recent CRD staff report shows that 80% of all CRD programs and services have four or less member participants, and 55% involve only one participant. Less than 10% involve all 17 member participants, i.e. are regional in scale
The CRD Board has 24 members. Of those, 21 are either mayors or councillors who serve on over 80 separate CRD committees and commissions for matters that generally have nothing to do with lives of the over 300,000 urban residents. Why do we bother to call it a regional district? And why add 15 more elected officials without more authority? How would simply electing Board members resolve the fundamental issue of conflict of interest unless there is radical change to how members are selected, such that their loyalty was not to a specific municipality but instead to a general distribution of the regional population? The new Board members cannot also serve as elected municipal councillors.
Assume an elected Chair and 14 or 16 Board members with an expanded mandate. Instead of representing a specific municipality, they would need to be elected on a sub-regional scale that reflects general distribution of the population of the CRD, i.e. Peninsula, Gulf Islands, Westshore, Rural and Urban core, similar to a regional ward system.
Reform of the CRD cannot be restricted to how Board members are elected, but must also consider their mandate (i.e. expanded regional role for the CRD?) and whose interests they represent. Is the Province ready to implement such changes?
It is possible that the Province could implement reforms without having to amend the provisions in the Local Government Act and Community Charter that protect the mantra of local independence and autonomy (a cornerstone of municipal government advocated by the Union of British Columbia Municipalities). Strengthening roles and responsibilities of regional districts would not necessarily threaten the autonomy of municipal governments to continue to provide local neighborhood services. Unfortunately, this implies a strengthening of the CRD that would not necessarily resolve the parochial challenges created by our plethora of small municipalities (13 is too many). Councils in Greater Victoria must support community referenda on questions of mergers with natural partners to remedy that problem.
- Jim Anderson
November 10, 2016
Nearly everyone recognizes that the current governance structure of the CRD Board and the selection of its member appointments by municipal councils is neither accountable nor democratic.
Recently suggestions have been made that the remedy is simply to elect a separate Chair and Board members. The Chair would then be the de facto super mayor of Greater Victoria, and able to represent the region on federal and provincial matters.
While that may be a prudent change, it does not resolve fundamental structural flaws and the operation of regional districts in BC:
- An unaccountable, unelected membership of the CRD Board who are all appointed by their municipal councils. In this case, from 13 municipalities and three unorganized regional representatives
- Board members are in conflict of interest, as their fundamental responsibility is not regional in scope, but to represent interests of their own municipality. This is magnified in certain urban based “poly centric” regional districts, such as Victoria and Vancouver, where a common population base of large urban cities is subdivided into several separate municipal fiefdoms, each of whom promote localism over regional interests. The corollary of this is also true; the result is that primary role of the CRD is not regional in scope, but generally confined to provide local services to residents of unorganized areas (i.e. Juan de Fuca, Southern Gulf Islands, Salt Spring Island) and a few of the small municipalities.
- A regional district can only assume a function or provide a service as requested and approved by all or some of its members (whether one or more municipalities, or by residents of the unorganized areas). Otherwise, the role of any regional district is very limited.
Serious negative consequences arise from these structural limitations. Instead of agreeing to share regional-scale service delivery, most municipal councils choose to try provide their own local services, e.g. planning, police fire, roads, water delivery, garbage collection etc. In doing so they ignore the obvious daily interaction of regional residents who travel across the region to work, play, learn, and shop in municipalities other than where they live. Further natural and emergency occurrences such as floods, fires, chemical spills, earthquakes, environment issues (I.e. air, water, wildlife) do not respect municipal boundaries, but the impacts are either shared by all residents or by municipalities that are least prepared and equipped to deal with them. Neither are urban crime or social issues confined to local neighbourhoods.
What would be the effect of having an elected CRD Board if the few mandated regional services it provides continue to be limited to only water supply, landfill, sewerage, and regional parks? It means that critical issues, such a regional land use plan, transportation, emergency services and transit, which can only be resolved at a regional scale, would still be provided by small local units whose prime motive is to protect their self interest. We get 7 emergency dispatch centres, 17 fire departments, 5 police chiefs, 7 recreation commissions etc. and no regional transportation authority. And rural residents continue to get a free ride as they use urban services funded only by urban taxpayers. This is violation of the principle that those who benefit from a service should pay for it.
Resolution can be achieved by either of two separate approaches. The Province could expand the mandate of region districts, or by amalgamation of some or all municipalities that recognize common interest or to achieve economies of expanded scale of service delivery.
A typical CRD Board meeting agenda reveals that the majority of items relate only to a single municipality or to rural residents. A recent CRD staff report shows that 80% of all CRD programs and services have four or less member participants, and 55% involve only one participant. Less than 10% involve all 17 member participants, i.e. are regional in scale
The CRD Board has 24 members. Of those, 21 are either mayors or councillors who serve on over 80 separate CRD committees and commissions for matters that generally have nothing to do with lives of the over 300,000 urban residents. Why do we bother to call it a regional district? And why add 15 more elected officials without more authority? How would simply electing Board members resolve the fundamental issue of conflict of interest unless there is radical change to how members are selected, such that their loyalty was not to a specific municipality but instead to a general distribution of the regional population? The new Board members cannot also serve as elected municipal councillors.
Assume an elected Chair and 14 or 16 Board members with an expanded mandate. Instead of representing a specific municipality, they would need to be elected on a sub-regional scale that reflects general distribution of the population of the CRD, i.e. Peninsula, Gulf Islands, Westshore, Rural and Urban core, similar to a regional ward system.
Reform of the CRD cannot be restricted to how Board members are elected, but must also consider their mandate (i.e. expanded regional role for the CRD?) and whose interests they represent. Is the Province ready to implement such changes?
It is possible that the Province could implement reforms without having to amend the provisions in the Local Government Act and Community Charter that protect the mantra of local independence and autonomy (a cornerstone of municipal government advocated by the Union of British Columbia Municipalities). Strengthening roles and responsibilities of regional districts would not necessarily threaten the autonomy of municipal governments to continue to provide local neighborhood services. Unfortunately, this implies a strengthening of the CRD that would not necessarily resolve the parochial challenges created by our plethora of small municipalities (13 is too many). Councils in Greater Victoria must support community referenda on questions of mergers with natural partners to remedy that problem.
- Jim Anderson